Kubert v. Best: Oops, I Sent It Again by Blackman, Julia
Science and Technology Law Review
Volume 17 | Number 1 Article 4
2014
Kubert v. Best: Oops, I Sent It Again
Julia Blackman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Science and
Technology Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Julia Blackman, Kubert v. Best: Oops, I Sent It Again, 17 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 59 (2014)
https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech/vol17/iss1/4
Kubert v. Best:
Oops, I Sent it Again!
Julia Blackmon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Text messages permit cell phone users to maintain communication in
situations where a voice call would be impractical, impossible, or socially
unacceptable. Because of the distraction that this new form of communica-
tion might bring, some states have rightly provided civil and criminal penal-
ties for those who text while driving and, as a result, unintentionally injure
others., Kubert v. Best takes a radical approach in fighting the texting while
driving craze. The issue in this case is whether a person, who is not operating
a motor vehicle but sending a text message to the operator of a motor vehicle,
may also be liable to persons because the driver was distracted by receiving
the text message.2
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held that a
"sender of a text message can potentially be liable if an accident is caused by
texting, but only if the sender knew or had special reason to know that the
recipient would view the text while driving and thus be distracted."3 The
court explained that the mere sending of a text is not enough to find liability.4
Hence, the court held that it will only hold the sender of a text liable if the
sender knows or had reason to know that the recipient of a text message is
driving and is likely to read the text message while driving.5 The court
opined that if the sender of a text has such knowledge, then the sender has
"taken a foreseeable risk in sending the text message at that time."6 Although
this case presents another avenue to stop the texting while driving trend, the
sender of a text should not be held liable for the recipient's actions. It is the
recipient of a text who decides when to answer the phone or respond to
messages, not the sender. It is unfair to hold a sender of a text liable when the
recipient is the one who chooses to disobey the law and text while driving. In
addition, it will be difficult for plaintiffs who bring this type of claim to
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Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. She would like to
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1. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.305 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 321.276 (West 2012) (provides no civil or criminal penalties, but prohibits
the conduct).
2. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1218-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
3. Id. at 1219.
4. Id. at 1226.
5. Id. at 1219.
6. Id. at 1227.
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prove that the sender knew or should have known the recipient was driving
and would immediately respond to the text, as illustrated in this case.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In Best, plaintiffs Linda Kubert and David Kubert (collectively, "the
Kuberts") "were grievously injured by an eighteen-year-old driver who was
texting while driving and crossed the center-line of the road," which caused
an accident.7 The defendants were Kyle Best ("Best") and Shannon Colonna
("Colonna").8 Best was the driver who was texting while driving and injured
the plaintiffs.9 Colonna, a seventeen-year-old, sent Best text messages
seconds before the accident.' 0 The Kuberts' claims against Best were settled
and were not part of this appeal." I This case deals with the Kuberts' appeal of
the trial court's dismissal of their claims against Colonna.12
The day of the accident, Best and Colonna began to exchange text
messages as Best drove home from work.13 Best and Colonna saw each other
socially, but were not exclusively dating.14 Best's phone records show that
Best and Colonna "texted each other sixty-two times on the day of the acci-
dent, about an equal number of texts originating from each."'5 Best initiated
the texting as he was about to drive home.16 At 5:48:14 p.m., Colonna sent
Best a text.17 Best responded to Colonna's text at 5:48:58 p.m.' 8 The se-
quence of the text messages exchanged imply that the plaintiffs' accident,
occurred sometime between Best's text message to Colonna, and the call
made to the police at 5:49:15p.m.19
That same day, the Kuberts were riding their motorcycle.20 As they
came around the curve on the road, the pick-up truck Best was driving
crossed the double centerline of the roadway into the plaintiffs' lane.21 The
7. Id. at 1218.
8. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1214.
9. Id. at 1219.
10. Id. at 1220.
11. Id. at 1218.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1220.






20. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1219.
21. Id.
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Kuberts attempted to dodge Best's pick-up truck but were unable to do so. 22
The front driver's side of the truck struck the plaintiffs and their motorcy-
cle.23 The collision nearly severed David Kubert's left leg and it fractured
Linda Kubert's left leg, leaving her fractured thighbone protruding out of the
skin as she lay injured in the road.24 Best stopped his truck and after seeing
the severity of the injuries, he called 911.25 Best, a volunteer fireman, aided
the Kuberts to the best of his ability until the police and the medical respond-
ers arrived.26 Medical treatment did not save the plaintiffs from losing their
left legs.2 7 At the time of the accident, a New Jersey statute prohibited texting
while driving.28 Under New Jersey law, it is illegal to use a cell phone that is
not hands-free while driving, except in certain specifically described emer-
gency situations.29 Before the outcome of this case, the New Jersey legisla-
ture enacted a new law that provides criminal penalties for those who are
distracted by the use of cell phones while driving and injure others. 30 This
new statute, however, does not apply to this case.3'
III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
The Kubert's appealed the dismissal of their claims against Colonna in
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division in 2013 alleging sev-
eral causes of action.32 The plaintiffs' claims were that Colonna: (1) was





26. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1219.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1218.
29. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3 (2010) (noting that "the use of a
wireless telephone or electronic communication device by an operator of a
moving motor vehicle on a public road or highway shall be unlawful except
when the telephone is a hands-free wireless telephone or the electronic commu-
nication device is used hands-free").
30. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1218; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(c)(1) (2012)
("[A] person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a
vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily
injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if
serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury
results. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone
while driving a motor vehicle ... may give rise to the inference that the defen-
dant was driving recklessly.").
31. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1233 n.2.
32. Id. at 1221.
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mate cause of the accident; (2) aided and abetted Best's unlawful texting
while he was driving; and (3) had an independent duty to avoid texting a
person who was driving a motor vehicle.33
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
Prior to this appeal, the Kuberts filed a claim against Best and after
learning of Colonna's involvement, added her to the lawsuit.34 The claims
against Best have been settled and are not part of this appeal.35 The plaintiffs
appeal the trial court's dismissal against Colonna.36 The trial court held that a
remote texter does not have a legal duty to avoid sending text messages to a
driver.37
V. COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING AND OVERVIEW
OF RATIONALE
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held that
Colonna was not liable for the accident because the plaintiffs failed to prove
that Colonna not only knew that Best was driving when she texted him, but
that she knew that Best would immediately respond to her text while he was
driving. 38 The court stated that there is no liability when a sender of a text
message merely texts the recipient, who happens to be driving, and that the
recipient still bears the responsibility for obeying the law and maintaining
safe control of the vehicle.39
VII. COURT'S RATIONALE
The court noted that although Best was the driver of the vehicle in the
accident, more than one defendant can be the proximate cause of an injury
and be liable for causing the injury.40 The court stated that limited duty of
care may be imposed on the sender of a text message if the sender of the text
knew or had a special reason to know that the receiver of the text was driv-
ing, and was likely to read the text message while driving.4' First, the court
examined past precedent on the duty of care of passengers of motor vehicles
to third parties. Second,, since duty of care is "generally a matter for a court
to decide," the court analyzed the process by which it determined whether a
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1221.
35. Id. at 1218.
36. Id. at 1219.
37. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1218.
38. Id. at 1219.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1222.
41. Id. at 1229.
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duty of care exists by applying a full duty analysis.42 Third, the court ana-
lyzed if the sender of a text has taken a foreseeable risk in sending a text to
the recipient.43
First, the court looked at past precedent to determine whether a duty of
care should be imposed on passengers to third parties.44 The plaintiffs
claimed that although Colonna was not physically present in the vehicle with
Best, she was "electronically present" and should be liable for aiding and
abetting his unlawful use of a cell phone.45 The court found that the plaintiffs
second claim of aiding and abetting had no merit, since there was no evi-
dence proving that Colonna controlled Best's actions or that Colonna pro-
vided "substantial assistance" to Best in failing obey the law.46 The court,
however, stated that a passenger who distracts a driver could be held liable
for the passenger's own negligence in causing an accident.47 Thus, a passen-
ger in a motor vehicle has a duty to not interfere with the driver's opera-
tions.48 The court went on to say that one form of interference by a passenger
might be obstructing the driver's view or diverting the driver's attention from
tasks other than driving.49 The court opined that a passenger could also be
held liable for urging the driver to take his eyes off the road and to look at
distracting objects, but only if the passenger's conduct is unreasonably risky;
that is, the passenger knows, or has special reason to know, that the driver
will in fact be distracted and drive negligently as a result of the passenger's
actions.50
Second, the court determined whether a limited duty could be imposed
on the sender of text messages by applying a full duty analysis as described
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Estate of Desir ex. rel. Estiverne v.
Vertus.5' The court analyzed the process to decide whether a duty of care
exists to prevent injury to another.52 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Desir
held that to engage in a "full duty analysis," four factors must be evaluated:
(1) the relationship of the parties; (2) the nature of the risk; (3) the ability to
42. Id. at 1222.
43. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1222.
44. See id. at 1221-23.
45. Id. at 1224.
46. Id. at 1225.
47. Id. at 1226.
48. Id.
49. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1226.
50. Id. at 1227.
51. Id. at 1223; see also Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247,
1255 (2013).
52. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1223.
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exercise care; and (4) public policy considerations. 53 The Best court stated
that these factors should be analyzed to determine whether the law recog-
nizes a duty of care in the particular circumstances of a negligence case. 54
The court acknowledged that "[i]t is the primary responsibility of the driver
to obey the law and to avoid distractions"55 and that imposing a duty on a
passenger for "any conduct" that could distract the driver would unnecessa-
rily broaden the scope of conduct that could create liability.56 The court
stated that such duty must be viewed under the totality of the circumstances
and that the scope of that duty must be reasonable under those
circumstances 57
Third, since foreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational ele-
ment in the determination of whether a duty exists, the court analyzed if a
sender of text messages has taken a foreseeable risk in sending a text to the
recipient.58 The court reasoned that foreseeability is based on the "defen-
dant's knowledge of the risk of injury."59 The court stated it is:
foreseeable that a driver who is actually distracted by a text mes-
sage might cause an accident and serious injuries or death, but it is
not generally foreseeable that every recipient of a text message
who is driving will neglect his obligation to obey the law and will
be distracted by the text.60
The court opined that a sender should be able to assume that the recipi-
ent will read a text message only when it is safe and legal to do so; that is,
when not operating a vehicle.61 Nonetheless, if the sender knows that the
recipient is driving and will read the text message immediately, then the
sender has taken a foreseeable risk in sending a text to the recipient.62 The
court went on to say that if the sender knowingly engaged in this distracting
conduct (i.e., sending a text), it is not unwarranted to hold the sender respon-
sible for the distraction63 The court stated that when a defendant's actions
are easily corrected and the harm sought to be presented is serious, it is fair
53. Desir, 69 A.3d at 1258.
54. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1223.
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to impose a duty.64 The court indicated that when a risk of harm is posed by a
third person, the plaintiff may be required to prove that the third person knew
or had reason to know, either from actual knowledge or past experience, that
the conduct of the third person would likely endanger the safety of another.65
Thus, the court concluded that when the sender of a text message knows,
from actual or inferred knowledge, that the recipient would view the text
while driving, the sender has breached a duty of care to the public by dis-
tracting the driver.66
Ultimately, the court concluded that a limited duty on senders of text
messages is supported by the "full duty analysis" outlined by the New Jersey
Supreme Court.67 There are four elements for the court to look at.68 First, as
to the relationship of the parties, the court noted that when the sender of a
text message knows that the text will reach the recipient while operating a
vehicle, the sender has a responsibility to the public who use the roadways.69
The court analogized it to the responsibility of a passenger physically present
in the vehicle.70 Thus, although the sender is not physically present, he is
"electronically present" and must avoid distracting the driver.7' Second, as to
the nature of the risk, the court stated that when the sender texts a recipient
driver, knowing that the recipient will immediately view the text while driv-
ing, the sender has disregarded the attendant and foreseeable risk of harm to
the public.72 Third, as to the ability to exercise care, the court stated that a
sender of a text has the opportunity to exercise care and prevent the risk.73
The court noted that "[w]hen the defendant's actions are 'relatively easily
corrected' and the harm sought to be presented is 'serious,' it is fair to im-
pose a duty."74 Thus, the court opined, that it is easy for the senders of the
text to avoid knowingly texting a recipient driver who will immediately view
the text, which will distract the driver from driving safely.75 Fourth, as to the
public policy considerations, the court stated that it is in the public's interest
to require fair measures to deter texting while driving.76 The court analogized
64. Id. at 1228.
65. Id. at 1227-28.





71. Id. at 1224,




76. Id. at 1229.
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drinking and driving to texting and driving.77 The court opined that just as
drinking and driving has become a public interest, the hazards of texting
when on the road "may become part of the public consciousness when the
liability of those involved matches the seriousness of the harm."7s The court
can use these four elements and a totality of the circumstances analysis to
determine if it can impose a limited scope of duty.79
In the end, Colonna's summary judgment motion was granted and the
Kubert's claims against Colonna were dismissed.80 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs did not have enough evidence to prove that Colonna knew both
that Best was driving when she texted Best, and that he would violate the law
and immediately respond to her text.81
VII. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S APPROACH
Sending a "quick text" has become a popular mode of communication in
our fast-paced society. This mode of communication, however, has also been
the cause of many injuries and fatalities since drivers of motor vehicles insist
on responding to text messages while driving; even when it is against the law
to do so. 82 Although this case presents another approach to stop the tragedies
that occur while texting and driving, it is unfair for the court to hold the
sender of texts liable for the recipient's actions. It is the recipient, not the
sender, who ultimately decides when to respond to messages.
This holding will open the floodgates to frivolous lawsuits because re-
cipients will want to shift the blame to the sender and minimize their per-
sonal liability. This holding shifts the focus from the recipient to the sender
of the text, who may not know that the recipient is driving, let alone, that the
recipient will respond to the text while driving. Because the sender is not
physically present in the vehicle, the sender lacks the first-hand knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the recipient at the time the message is
being sent.83 Ultimately, it is the recipient, not the sender, who has the per-
sonal responsibility to obey traffic laws and exercise appropriate care for the
safety of other drivers while on the road.84
77. Id.
78. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229.
79. Id. at 1228.
80. Id. at 1229.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1218 (explaining that New Jersey law prohibits texting while
driving).
83. See id. at 1230 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
84. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1230 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
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The concurring opinion noted "the bar set by the majority for the impo-
sition of liability is high and will rarely be met."85 This limited duty will be
difficult to prove since the liability arises from the conduct of a person that
was not in the vehicle and lacks the first-hand knowledge of the recipient's
attendant circumstances.86 There is no need to establish a new standard, espe-
cially when the present case does not support liability upon the remote
sender.87 As illustrated in this case, Colonna, the sender of the texts, was not
found liable for the plaintiffs' injuries since there was not enough evidence to
establish that Colonna knew or should have reasonably known that Best was
on the road and that he would immediately answer her text.88 Colonna could
not have known that Best was driving, unless he specifically told her in his
texts that he was in the vehicle driving.
This holding may also have some implications on the right to privacy.
The court in the present case noted that the content of the texts between Best
and Colonna was unknown.89 Had the plaintiffs been able to obtain and ex-
amine the messages that Best and Colonna exchanged with one another,
seconds before the Kubert's accident, the plaintiffs might have been able to
prove that Colonna knew or had reason to know that Best was driving when
she texted him. This raises the question of whether the content of text mes-
sage communications will be examined by third parties-who are not parties
to the communication-in order to determine if the sender knew or should
have known that the recipient was driving and would immediately text back.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "cell phone and text mes-
sage communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them
to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-
identification ...[which] might strengthen the case for an expectation of
privacy."90 Thus, some courts have held that as technology has progressed,
text messages deserve the same Fourth Amendment protections afforded to
letters and phone calls.91 Although the issue of privacy in text messages has
not yet been fully decided by the Supreme Court, courts should not use this
opportunity to narrow the privacy protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment. It is well established that, "nothing new can be put into the
85. Id. at 1229 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
86. See id. at 1230 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 1229-30 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 1229
89. Id. at 1221.
90. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010); see also Kamalu
v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. l:13-cv-00627-SAB, 2013 WL 4403903, at *3
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff did not have privacy rights
in phone records sought since defendant was only seeking subscriber informa-
tion, which is voluntarily conveyed to cell phone provider by third parties, and
not the content of any communications).
91. State v. Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
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Constitution except through the amendatory process." 92 Hence, legislators,
not courts, have the privilege of expanding or narrowing basic constitutional
protections. For instance, before this case was decided, the New Jersey legis-
lature enacted a new law that makes an assault by auto or vessel a crime of
the fourth degree. 93 This law explicitly permits a jury to infer that a driver
who was using a hand-held cell phone and caused serious bodily injury to
another was driving recklessly.94 Thus, this new amendment exposes the
driver to a potential sentence in state prison.95 Had the legislature wanted to
expand the liability to senders of text messages, it would have done so when
the new law was enacted.
VIII. OVERVIEW OF THE CRITIQUE
In summary, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey took a radical approach and stated that a limited duty may be imposed
to senders of text messages. This presents an excessive approach to combat-
ing the texting while driving trend by broadening the scope of liability to
persons who are in a remote location from the driver of a vehicle. Questions
have been raised as to whether this will open up the floodgates to frivolous
lawsuits, how the elements required for the limited duty imposed by this
holding will ever be met, and whether this holding will eventually infringe on
an individual's right to privacy. In addition, this holding could impact cell
phone manufacturers and carriers. No doubt consumers will be afraid to send
text messages because of the risk of liability. Cell phone manufacturers and
carriers could be required to make all cell phones incapable of use when
sensing they are in motion. And if this holding catches on, it could eventually
minimize or take away all personal responsibility from the driver and shift
the liability to cell phone manufacturers, leaving the driver with little or no
liability for his or her actions.
92. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (2012).
94. See id.
95. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1218.
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